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phenomenon can have on a care provider’s per-
sonal and professional life. Care providers can 
suﬀ er from guilt, anger, psychological distress, 
fear, insomnia, and long -term consequences sim-
ilar to post traumatic stress disorder, which often 
results in signiﬁ cant functional impairment.8,10,11 
Th ere can be a negative impact on their patients, 
colleagues, supervisors, managers, and organiza-
tion as well.10 Th e prevalence of the second victim 
experience is estimated to be as high as %.11 
Health-care leaders need to be aware of the high 
INTRODUCTION Medical procedures performed 
in hospitals carry the risk of side eﬀ ects.1-4 As 
many as  in  patients is involved in an adverse 
event.3,5 However, when an adverse event occurs, 
patients and their families are not the only vic-
tims. Health care professionals involved in a se-
rious adverse event can also suﬀ er. Th ese health 
care professionals are often referred to as “sec-
ond victims”.6-10
A systematic review by Seys et al.10 identiﬁ ed 
the signiﬁ cant impact that the second victim 
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ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION After an adverse event, not only patients and family members but also health care 
professionals involved in the event become victims. More than 50% of all health care professionals suf-
fer emotionally and professionally after being involved in an adverse event. Support is needed for these 
“second victims” to prevent a further negative impact on patient care.
OBJECTIVES The aim of the study was to evaluate the prevalence and content of organizational -level 
support systems for health care professionals involved in an adverse event.
METHODS A survey was sent to 109 Belgian hospitals regarding 2 aspects: first, the availability of 
a protocol for supporting second victims; and, second, the presence of a contact person in the organiza-
tion to provide support. A total of 59 hospitals participated in the study. Hospitals were asked to submit 
their protocols for providing support to second victims. A content analysis based on an Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement’s white paper and the Scott Model was performed to evaluate the protocols.
RESULTS Thirty organizations had a systematic plan to support second victims. Twelve percent could 
not identify a contact person. The chief nursing officer was seen as one of the main contact people 
when something went wrong. In terms of the quality of the protocols, only a minority followed part of 
the international resources.
CONCLUSIONS A minority of hospitals are somewhat prepared to provide support for health care profes-
sionals. Management should take a leadership role in establishing support protocols for their health care 
professionals in the aftermath of an adverse event.
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not been formally evaluated. If an organization 
were to have some of the features in place, how-
ever, it could be more prepared for supporting 
second victims.
In this study, we focus on the current support 
protocols at an organizational level. Th ree re-
search questions were posed: ) What is the preva-
lence of second victim support protocols?; ) Who 
is the main organizational contact person for 
second victims?; and ) Are these second vic-
tim protocols following published internation-
al recommendations?
Methods Study design and setting In this study, 
a quantitative descriptive design was used. First, 
a survey explored the prevalence of systematic 
plans to support second victims and the function 
and role of the ﬁ rst contact person for second vic-
tim support. Second, the participating hospitals 
provided their second victim support protocols for 
a content analysis. All Dutch speaking hospitals 
in Belgium (n = ) were invited to participate.
Study protocol A survey was sent to the chief 
executive oﬃ  cer, the chief medical oﬃ  cer, and 
the chief nursing oﬃ  cer of each hospital. Th is 
survey included an introduction on second vic-
tims and the following questions: ) Do you have 
a systematic plan to take care of second victims?; 
and ) Who in your organization is the main con-
tact person for second victims? (FIGURE 1A). Re-
spondents who answered “yes” to the ﬁ rst sur-
vey question were invited to submit their pro-
tocol for content analysis (FIGURE 1B). Th e proto-
cols were analysed based on selected items from 
the IHI white paper,26 and the Scott’s interven-
tional model of second victim support.16 Th e IHI 
white paper advises organizations on how to ap-
propriately respond when a serious clinical ad-
verse event occurs.26 It contains a “Clinical Cri-
sis Management Plan” that addresses special sup-
port considerations for second victims:
1 Is there an organizational / contact per-
son for health-care professionals involved in 
the event?
2 Have we assessed the personal safety of the in-
volved health-care professionals?
3 What are we hearing from the involved health-
-care professionals?
4 Has the organization expressed empathy and 
been visible?
5 Have the involved health-care professionals 
been invited to participate in the root cause anal-
ysis?
Th e Scott Model16 suggests  items for eﬀ ec-
tive support:
1 Creating awareness and education about 
the second victim phenomenon (the ﬁ rst step to 
promoting open dialogue);
2 “Immediate emotional ﬁ rst aid” (this is im-
mediate support from colleagues or supervisor 
from within the respective department/unit by 
asking “How are you doing?” and oﬀ ering colle-
gial support);
incidence and provide supportive interventions 
to prevent functional impairment,7,10 improve 
quality of care, and sustain a culture of patient 
safety12 because no support can make the situ-
ation even worse.
Research has shown that there is an increased 
emotional burden when second victims consider 
the institutional handling of the adverse event to 
be poor.9,13 Health-care professionals, however, 
struggle to ﬁ nd support after an adverse event 
or do not know where to look for assistance or 
guidance.9,14,15 Th erefore, education about orga-
nizational support services is necessary.16
Th e type of adverse event and perceived per-
sonal responsibility may inﬂ uence the emotion-
al reactions, and, consequently, the support re-
quired.13,17 Some studies have shown that there 
are diﬀ erences in coping between professions and 
gender; for example, women tend to identify as 
second victims more often than men.7,15,18,19 Oth-
er studies have observed that responses do not 
vary from profession to profession—for exam-
ple, physicians do not react diﬀ erently from nurs-
es.20 Several studies have reported support from 
colleagues as the most common and appreciated 
source.10,15,21-23 Second victims ﬁ nd it important 
that someone reassures them about their pro-
fessional competencies.9,10,22 In a recent study 
by Pinto et al.,24 patient safety managers consid-
ered prompt debrieﬁ ng, information about pro-
cesses after incidents, and guidance and men-
toring by senior colleagues as very important 
forms of support. While these supports were 
rated highly in terms of importance, they were 
not always rated highly in terms of availability.24 
Health-care institutions often failed to provide 
support,7,25,26 and given the frequency with which 
adverse events occur, this appears to be an im-
portant issue to address.13 Th ere are many rea-
sons why health-care organizations do not rou-
tinely oﬀ er support—it may not be a priority, it 
may be oﬀ ered in an informal way, or the orga-
nization may not know how to develop and im-
plement a formal support system.27
In a recent literature review on support sys-
tems for second victims, Seys et al.10 identiﬁ ed 
 published recommendations for second vic-
tim support at the organizational level. Th ese 
are the Institute for Healthcare Improvement 
(IHI)’s white paper, “Respectful Management of 
Serious Clinical Adverse Events”,26 and Scott’s 
“Th ree -Tiered Model of Second Victim Sup-
port”.16 Th e IHI’s white paper focuses on avoid-
ing harm after the crisis of an adverse event. It 
takes the  “victims” into account: the patient/
family, the health-care professional, and the or-
ganization. Th e Scott three -tiered emotional sup-
port system focuses on support for health-care 
professionals as second victims. Both resources 
were developed by experts in the ﬁ eld and can 
provide a structure for systematic second vic-
tim support. Th ey oﬀ er a framework for orga-
nizations to develop support. However, these 
protocols are not theoretically derived and have 
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was made of the included items to obtain an over-
all score. A detailed feedback report with the over-
all and hospital -speciﬁ c results was provided to 
the participating hospitals.
RESULTS  Fifty -nine of  Dutch -speaking hos-
pitals (.%) in Belgium participated in the sur-
vey. Th e participants were  general hospitals, 
 psychiatric hospitals, and  rehabilitation cen-
ters (FIGURE 1A).
Prevalence of support protocols and main contact per-
son for second victims  In total,  of the  par-
ticipating hospitals (.%) had a protocol for 
second victim support (FIGURE 1A). In particu-
lar, .% of the participating general hospi-
tals (n = ), .% of the psychiatric hospitals 
(n = ), and none of the rehabilitation hospitals 
had a support protocol available.
With respect to research question , regard-
ing the main organizational contact person for 
second victims, .% of the hospitals reported 
a combination of people and functions, .% 
reported the chief nursing oﬃ  cer, and  orga-
nizations (.%) did not know who would be 
the contact person within their health-care or-
ganization (TABLE 1).
Content analysis of the submitted protocols Th ir-
ty hospitals who answered positively to research 
question  were asked to submit their protocols 
for a content analysis. Eighteen protocols were 
submitted, yielding a response rate of %. Out 
of the  organizations,  were general hospitals 
(.%) and  were psychiatric hospitals (.%). 
Th e results of the content analysis according to 
the IHI recommendations26 are presented ﬁ rst, 
followed by the results of the content analysis 
according to the Scott Model.16
Content analysis based on the items recommended in 
the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s white paper 
In .% of the submitted protocols (n = ), 
an organizational / contact person for second 
victims was included (TABLE 2). None of the hos-
pitals included in their protocol an invitation to 
health-care professionals to participate in the root 
cause analysis. Other aspects of the protocols that 
were analyzed against the IHI recommendations 
are shown in TABLE 2.
Looking at the individual protocols, the max-
imum number of items included in the proto-
cols was  of  (TABLE 3). More than eighty per-
cent (.%) of the general hospitals and .% 
of the psychiatric hospitals had only  or few-
er items of the IHI recommendations. None of 
the protocols contained all  items recommend-
ed by the IHI.
Content analysis based on the items of the Scott Model 
Looking at the  criteria of the Scott Model,16 only 
 general hospitals (.%) and  psychiatric hos-
pitals (.%) included an item regarding speciﬁ c 
education about the second victim phenomenon 
3 Support from trained peer supporters and 
other internal resources;
4 Referral for counseling;
5 Monthly meetings for peer supporters to 
share best practices and review recent case in-
terventions.
Every protocol submitted to the research team 
was checked for these  items. Th e protocols 
were independently analyzed by  researchers 
of the research team. Th ey were thoroughly eval-
uated point by point for these items. If an item 
was present, it was marked as “”, if not, as “”. 
If no consensus was reached by the  researchers, 
a third researcher (a full professor in health servic-
es research) was consulted. Afterwards, the sum 
PART A
PART B
Survey including 2 research questions was sent to 109 hospitals.
Question 1: Do you have a systematic plan to take care of second victims?
Question 2: Who in your organization would be the contact person for second 
victims? 
Reminder sent to nonresponders after 3 weeks
59 of 109 hospitals participated in the survey
– 37 general hospitals
– 19 psychiatric hospitals
– 3 rehabilitation centers
30 organizations, who indicated that they have a protocol for second victim 
support, were invited to submit their protocol for content analysis. These included:
– 15 general hospitals
– 15 psychiatric hospitals
Reminder sent to nonresponders after 10 weeks
Content analysis of the documents of 18 organizations (out of 30) according to the 
IHI white paper and the Scott Model. These included protocols from: 
– 7 general hospitals
– 11 psychiatric hospitals
Content analysis based
on the 5 items of the IHI report
Content analysis based on the 
5 items of the Scott Model
FIGURE Overview 
of the study protocol and 
prevalence of second 
victim support protocols
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DISCUSSION Blaming health-care profession-
als after an adverse event does not improve pa-
tient safety or prevent similar events from hap-
pening again.28 A health-care professional feel-
ing responsible for a serious medical adverse 
event may enter into a vicious cycle that pro-
vokes burnout, depression, and reduced empa-
thy. Th is can result in suboptimal patient care 
and higher odds for future errors.25 To be able to 
cope with such an event, there is a need for for-
mal and informal organizational support for sec-
ond victims.10 Th is study on the prevalence and 
content of support protocols for second victims 
in Belgian hospitals revealed that there is room 
(TABLE 4). Th e ﬁ rst tier, immediate emotional ﬁ rst 
aid, was present in nearly % of the psychiatric 
hospitals and nearly % of the general hospitals. 
Only  protocol for a general hospital contained 
information on monthly meetings to share best 
practices. Other results of the protocol content 
analysis are shown in TABLE 4. 
None of the analyzed protocols contained all 
 items of the Scott Model. Th e maximum score 
was  of  (TABLE 5). In total, .% of the partici-
pating hospitals had  items or fewer in their pro-
tocols, which amounts to .% and .% for 
the general and psychiatric hospitals, respectively.









combination of people and functions 15 (40.5) 9 (47.4) 2 (66.7) 26 (44.1)
chief nursing officer 3 (8.1) 3 (15.8) 0 6 (10.2)
special team 3 (8.1) 2 (10.5) 0 5 (8.5)
psychologist 4 (10.8) 1 (5.3) 0 5 (8.5)
patient care coordinator 3 (8.1) 0 0 3 (5.1)
chief executive officer 1 (2.7) 1 (5.3) 0 2 (3.4)
ombudsman 2 (5.4) 0 0 2 (3.4)
human resource manager 0 1 (5.3) 0 1 (1.7)
involved head nurse 0 1 (5.3) 0 1 (1.7)
involved medical doctor 1 (2.7) 0 0 1 (1.7)
not known who would be main contact person 5 (13.5) 1 (5.3) 1 (33.3) 7 (11.9)
Data are presented as number (percentage). 
TABLE 2 Content analysis based on the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s white paper
General hospitals (n = 7) Psychiatric hospitals (n = 11) Total (n = 18)
Is there an organizational 24/7 contact person for 
health-care professionals involved in the event?
6a (85.7) 9 (81.8) 15 (83.3)
Have we assessed the personal safety of the involved 
health-care professionals?
1 (14.3) 2 (18.2) 3 (16.7)
What are we hearing from the involved health-care 
professionals?
1 (14.3) 7 (63.6) 8 (44.4)
Has the organization expressed empathy and been 
visible?
1 (14.3) 2 (18.2) 3 (16.7)
Have involved health-care professionals been invited 
to participate in the root cause analysis?
0 0 0
Data are presented as number (percentage).
a This number means that 6 of 7 general hospitals included this item in their protoco l. This applies also to all other cells.
TABLE 3 Overview of the cumulative number of scored items according to the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s recommendations
Number of the items scored 
in the protocols
General hospitals (n = 7) Psychiatric hospitals (n = 11) Total (n = 18)
0 1 (14.3) 1 (9.1) 2 (11.1)
1 4 (57.1) 3 (27.3) 7 (38.9)
2 1 (14.3) 4 (36.4) 5 (27.8)
3 1 (14.3) 3 (27.3) 4 (22.2)
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
Data are presented as number (percentage).
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the hospitals included  or more tiers for emo-
tional support in their protocol. About % of 
the hospitals in our study provided support from 
colleagues (tier ), while support from trained 
peers was oﬀ ered in % of the hospitals (tier ). 
Tier , referral to professional help from psy-
chotherapists, social workers, chaplains,29 and 
others was less common. In the study by Scott 
et al.16 in , approximately % of the care-
givers found that tier , informal support from 
colleagues, is suﬃ  cient to meet their needs. Ap-
proximately % of the second victims required 
tier  (support from trained peers), and approx-
imately % of the second victims needed addi-
tional professional counseling and guidance.20 
Several studies have agreed that support of col-
leagues is the most appreciated.10,15,21-23 Since this 
kind of support can be as easy as a pat on the back 
or just letting one know that a colleague is there 
for them, the fact that this is included in the pro-
tocols only in % is surprising. However, because 
this is informal support, it might have not been 
included in the protocols.
In only  hospital, the support team meets 
monthly to share best practice and experience. 
Scott et al.9 suggested an arrangement of month-
ly meetings among peer supporters to share best 
practices and review recent case interventions. 
Despite intensive training possibilities, the mem-
bers of the support teams themselves may need 
support, too, as they will be confronted with ques-
tions and situations for which they may not be 
fully prepared.22,27
Attitudes and perspectives about appropriate 
ways to cope with an adverse event or regarding 
the use of any support service provided are like-
ly to be, in part, a product of the organizational 
culture.13 Having a protocol in place for support 
for improvement as only half of the participating 
hospitals have a protocol available, and none of 
the protocols had a perfect adherence to the IHI 
or Scott recommendations.
Implications More than a half of the participat-
ing organizations indicated that a combination 
of people/functions or the chief nursing oﬃ  cer 
is the ﬁ rst contact person for second victim sup-
port. About % of the organizations did not 
know who should be the contact person. Although 
a combination of people/functions might seem 
to be a feasible strategy, in moments of crisis, 
coordination and leadership are vital.26 A mix 
of people taking charge might be dangerous and 
could lead to confusion among the care team. 
Th e role of the chief nursing oﬃ  cer as contact per-
son needs to be carefully discussed as she/he may 
not always be seen as a conﬁ dant for all nurses. 
And, what about medical doctors as second vic-
tims—will they contact the chief nursing oﬃ  cer? 
One chief medical oﬃ  cer mentioned in the ﬁ rst 
round of the study (FIGURE 1A) that they do not 
need a support plan because the organization is 
small and everybody knows each other. As a struc-
tured approach for support has been suggested 
in the literature,10,16,26 we think this can be an un-
safe attitude.
Th e content analysis of the submitted protocols 
gives an idea of the quality. None of the analyzed 
protocols included all items suggested in the IHI‘s 
white paper or in the Scott Model. Th e maximum 
number of items included in the analyzed proto-
cols is  of  items for both recommendations. 
Less than one -quarter of the hospitals in our 
study included in their protocol the education 
of health-care professionals about the impact 
of adverse events. Somewhat more than % of 
TABLE 4 Content analysis based on the items of the Scott Three -Tiered Interventional Model of Second Victim Support
General hospitals (n = 7) Psychiatric hospitals (n = 11) Total (N = 18)
education about second victims 2 (28.6) 2 (18.2) 4 (22.2)
three -tiered emotional 
support model
tier 1: Immediate emotional 
“first aid”
4 (57.1) 8 (72.7) 12 (66.7)
tier 2: Support from trained 
peer supporters
5 (71.4) 6 (54.6) 11 (61.1)
tier 3: Referral for counseling 4 (57.1) 4 (36.4) 8 (44.4)
monthly meetings to share best practices 1 (14.3) 0 1 (5.6)
Data are presented as number (percentage).
TABLE 5 Overview of the cumulative number of scored items based on the Scott Model
Number of the items scored
in the protocols
General hospitals (n = 7) Psychiatric hospitals (n = 11) Total (n = 18)
0 1 (14.3) 1 (9.1) 2 (11.1)
1 0 2 (18.2) 2 (10.5)
2 2 (25.0) 6 (54.5) 8 (42.1)
3 4 (50.0) 2 (18.2) 6 (31.6)
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
Data are presented as number (percentage).
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It is also important to mention that the rec-
ommendations used for comparison are written 
for United States organizations in English, and 
are not yet translated for use in Belgium. Th ese 
methodological limitations can lead to an over- 
or underestimation of the quality of the proto-
cols reviewed in this study. Th erefore, additional 
qualitative interviews with hospital managers and 
human resources departments from both partic-
ipating and nonparticipating hospitals are sug-
gested to assess the overall approach.
Further research International knowledge 
sharing on second victim support will be neces-
sary. Th e websites of IHI (www.IHI.org) and of 
the Medically Induced Trauma Support Servic-
es (MITSS; www.mitss.org) oﬀ er an overview of 
champion organizations such as the ”forYou” pro-
gram at the University of Missouri22 and the Sec-
ond Victims Work Group at the Johns Hopkins 
Hospital.8,27 Th e MITSS has recently developed 
a toolkit to help organizations establish programs 
for second victim support.27 Th is toolkit is free 
at http://www.mitsstools.org/clinician -support-
-tool -kit -for -health care.html. Additional research 
on the eﬀ ectiveness of these support systems 
will be necessary. More research is needed to de-
termine possible diﬀ erences in approaches and 
the level or nature of support. It will be necessary 
to fully understand the second victim phenom-
enon and how organizations support and take 
care of their second victims. Qualitative studies 
involving focus groups or in -depth interviews 
with managers and second victims are suggested.
To conclude, a limited number of the organiza-
tions participating in our study have a protocol in 
place to support second victims. More than half 
of the organizations in the study suggested that 
a combination of people/functions or the chief 
nursing oﬃ  cer are probably the most appropriate 
contact people for second victim support. Both 
options have their limitations. Th e content anal-
ysis of the submitted protocols shows that there 
is room for improvement as none of the proto-
cols contained all items of the international rec-
ommendations on which we focused.
Organizations have to be fully prepared to ren-
der immediate support to second victims. Nega-
tive reactions should be prevented or limited by 
rendering support to prevent other incidents, 
sickness, absence, burnout, or even quitting 
the profession. Health-care organizations should 
develop structured programs with clear leader-
ship that start immediately following an adverse 
event as it is not advisable to wait until the cli-
nician reaches out. Support systems for second 
victims are an important pillar in the search for 
optimal patient safety.
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with extrapolating the results. Fifty organizations 
did not participate in our study, which is a meth-
odological limitation. It is possible that the orga-
nizations that did not participate in the study all 
have a protocol available with high compliance to 
the  standards, although we think this is doubt-
ful. Because the organizations were asked to sub-
mit their protocols to our university for exter-
nal content analysis, not all hospitals may have 
felt comfortable with this approach. Evaluation 
of paper protocols may not provide all the infor-
mation regarding the approach hospitals are tak-
ing to support second victims. It may be possible 
that health-care organizations provide more in-
formal support and do not include all this infor-
mation in a documented protocol. On the oth-
er hand, it is also possible that having a proto-
col in place does not ensure that staﬀ  actually re-
ceives good support after being involved in an ad-
verse event. However, it shows that the hospital 
is aware of the importance of support for second 
victims, which, in our opinion, is the ﬁ rst step in 
the right direction.
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